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Hurricane Katrina Decision Highlights
Liability for Decaying Infrastructure

A

March 2, 2012, decision from the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, little noticed
outside of New Orleans, has broad implications for the liability of federal agencies for
injuries caused by the decay or obsolescence of infrastructure due to erosion, sea level rise,
and other ongoing conditions, whether of natural
or human origin. Less directly, the decision also
affects the liability of state and municipal governments, and even private entities in charge of built
structures.
This article describes the underlying facts, the
decision, and its implications. It also considers how
governments and private parties can, to a limited
extent, protect themselves from this liability.

Mississippi River Gulf Outlet
The saga can be traced to 1956, when Congress
authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to build
a 76-mile channel to provide a shorter shipping route
between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans. The
channel became known as the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet or MRGO (pronounced Mr. Go).1 It was cut
through virgin coastal wetlands and into “fat clay,”
a form of very soft soil. The channel’s designers
considered and rejected lining its banks with riprap
(large rocks) or other armor.
In 1965, Hurricane Betsy hit New Orleans and
caused massive damage. Injured parties claimed that
the MRGO—which was then nearly complete—had
become a conduit that allowed the storm surge to
flood eastern New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish,
the county immediately southeast of New Orleans.2
The channel was initially designed to be 500 feet
wide, but over time the heavy traffic from oceangoing vessels caused so much turbulence that the
banks continually eroded and the channel required
constant dredging. The Corps finally armored the
banks in the 1980s, but by then MRGO had bloated
to more than triple its design width. This not only
meant that it could carry much more water, but it
also had more fetch (the width of open water that
wind can act upon), allowing a more forceful wave
attack, and the saltwater it carried killed much of the
wetlands vegetation that had tamed the waters.
When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005—just
a week shy of the 40th anniversary of Hurricane
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Betsy—the storm surge roared up MRGO again, but
this time it gathered so much force that it wiped out
levees and floodwalls that in the meantime had been
built along the way, devastating parts of New Orleans
and St. Bernard Parish. (The hurricane also caused
other levees to breach for other reasons.)
Over 400 plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana to recover for
Katrina-related damages. Seven of these plaintiffs
(the “Robinson plaintiffs”) went to trial. Judge
Stanwood R. Duval Jr. held a 19-day trial and on
Nov. 18, 2009, issued a 156-page decision.3 It was a
blistering account of what he found was the “gross
negligence” of the Corps in its operation of MRGO,
and it awarded just under $720,000 to five plaintiffs.
It left open the possibility of trials by hundreds of
additional plaintiffs and a final liability to the Corps
of hundreds of millions of dollars.4

In order to prevail, the plaintiffs needed
to overcome three major legal obstacles. Plaintiffs won on all three counts.
The Corps appealed. The Fifth Circuit issued its
decision on March 2, 2012.5 It found that the district court’s “careful attention to the law and even
more cautious scrutiny of complex facts allow us to
uphold its expansive ruling in full,” with one small
exception.
In order to prevail, the plaintiffs needed to overcome three major legal obstacles: a defense under
the Flood Control Act (FCA); the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA);
and the argument that the Corps was not negligent.
Plaintiffs won on all three counts. The first is of narrow application; not so the second and third.

Flood Control Act
The FCA was enacted in 1928 in response to
the catastrophic Mississippi River Valley flood of
1927.6 The flood control program it launched was
the largest public works project undertaken up to
that time in the United States.7 The FCA also pro-

vided in Section 702c that “[n]o liability of any kind
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for
any damage from or by floods or flood waters at
any place.”8 The Supreme Court has interpreted the
scope of this exemption as determined not “by the
character of the federal project or the purposes it
serves, but by the character of the waters that cause
the relevant damage and the purposes behind their
release.”9
In the Hurricane Katrina case, the Fifth Circuit
rejected the Corps’ defense that its decision to
dredge MRGO for many years instead of armoring it constituted flood-control activity that qualified it for Section 702c immunity. The court also
found that MRGO was not so interconnected with
a separate flood control project in the vicinity
as to make it part of that project. It concluded,
“the flood waters that destroyed the plaintiffs’ property were not released by any flood-control activity
or negligence therein.”

Sovereign Immunity
The lawsuit was brought under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which is a limited waiver of the federal
government’s sovereign immunity. This immunity
is subject to the discretionary-function exception
(DFE). The Corps vigorously argued that its decisions
with respect to the MRGO enjoyed this exception.
The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded. It declared
“the government enjoys immunity only where its
discretionary judgments are susceptible to publicpolicy analysis. The key judgment made by the
Corps, however, involved only the (mis-)application of objective scientific principles and not any
public-policy considerations: The Corps misjudged
the hydrological risk posed by the erosion of MRGO’s
banks.”
Citing the Supreme Court’s Berkovitz-Gaubert
test,10 the appeals court stated, “the relevant question is whether the discretionary judgment at issue
involved the application of objective technical principles or of policy considerations,” and that if the
discretion is “grounded in the policy of the regulatory
regime,” then “the decision is immune under the
DFE, even if it also entails application of scientific
principles. If it involves only the application of scientific principles, it is not immune.”
The Fifth Circuit found “ample record evidence
indicating that policy placed no role in the government’s decision to delay armoring MRGO.” Rather,
in the words of an amicus brief approvingly quoted
by the Fifth Circuit, “the Corps labored under the
mistaken scientific belief that the MRGO would not
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increase storm-surge risks….And because the Corps
disbelieved the scientific evidence of the MRGO’s
storm-surge effect, it did nothing to protect against
it.”
The Fifth Circuit said the plaintiffs “have mustered
enough record evidence to demonstrate that the
Corps’ negligent decisions rested on applications
of objective scientific principles and were not susceptible to policy considerations. At points where
it could have mattered, the Corps did not identify
MRGO’s ability to aggravate the effect of a major
hurricane. This is not a situation in which the Corps
recognized a risk and chose not to mitigate it out of
concern for some other public policy (e.g., navigation or commerce); it flatly failed to gauge the risk.
Accordingly, the DFE is inapplicable…”
Most states have their own rough equivalent of
the FTCA and its DFE. Thus, this analysis would be
relevant to state as well as federal liability. Therefore
if a state ignores scientific evidence that its infrastructure is vulnerable to a known phenomenon such
as sea level rise, it may be found to have waived its
sovereign immunity.

Environmental Impact
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
enhanced the liability of the Corps. NEPA requires
federal agencies to prepare environmental impact
statements (EISs) for major federal actions that may
have a significant impact on the environment. If the
federal action has not been completed or is continuing, an agency may have to undertake a supplemental EIS if after the initial EIS there are “significant
new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed
action or its impacts.”11
Here, the Corps had issued an EIS for flood control
activities back in 1976. Duval found it to be fatally
flawed. More importantly, despite the accumulation of evidence that conditions were significantly
changing (such as the degradation of MRGO from the
sloughing of its banks), the Corps never prepared a
supplemental EIS to inform its ongoing maintenance
and operation of the channel.
Though the Fifth Circuit discussed NEPA only
briefly, Duval analyzed it in detail. He found that an
agency bears a continuing obligation to update its
environmental evaluation in response to significant
new circumstances, and that failure to do so removes
the shield of the DFE. Here, Duval stated that “the
Corps itself internally recognized that the MRGO was
causing significant changes in the environment—that
is the disappearance of the adjacent wetlands to the
MRGO and the effects thereof on the human environment—which triggered reporting requirements. The
Corps cannot ignore the dictates of NEPA and then
claim the protection of the discretionary exception
based on its own apparent self-deception.”
Moreover, “the Court finds that there is the
causal connection between the Corps’ failures
to file the proper NEPA reports and the harm
which plaintiffs incurred. The loss of wetlands
and widening of the channel brought about by the
operation and maintenance of the MRGO clearly
were a substantial cause of plaintiffs’ injury. Had
the Corps adequately reported under the NEPA
standards, their activities and the effect on the
human environment would have had a full airing.”
Thus, this case supports the proposition that
federal agencies that operate and maintain infrastructure or buildings have an ongoing obligation
under NEPA to consider adapting to a changing envi-

ronment, or else they may be liable for resulting damages. Several states have laws that are equivalent to
NEPA, so a similar obligation may apply there to state
agencies and, in some states, municipalities as well.

Negligence
In FTCA cases, the tort law of the state where the
incident occurs supplies the substantive rules for
determining whether there has been negligence.12
Duval found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed,
that the Corps was negligent under the Louisiana
Civil Code.
State negligence rules vary, so each case—
whether in federal court under the FTCA, or in state
court—will need to be analyzed under the law of
the particular state.
As noted, the FTCA is an exception to sovereign immunity, and the DFE is a limitation to that
exception. None of this applies to the liability of
a private entity. Thus, if a privately owned structure does not withstand a disaster of natural or
human origin, a court considering liability for the
loss will look at whether its construction, operation or maintenance involved negligence under the
law of the state. The MRGO litigation is an example
of how a property manager was found liable for
ignoring scientific evidence of perils it faced; the
fact that the property manager was a federal agency
does not diminish the case’s relevance to a negligence analysis involving private parties. There is
no discretionary function exemption for private
liability.

the DFE. An after-the-fact justification is much less
effective.
In a similar manner, private liability that is based
on failure to disclose could be obviated at least in
part by the issuance of a disclosure. But such a
disclosure can itself have collateral consequences,
of course. If a building owner says that the walls may
collapse in a heavy but plausible storm, the owner’s
ability to obtain (or keep) its mortgage or its insurance policy may be seriously impaired.

Foreseeability
An important basis for the liability of the Corps
for MRGO was that scientific information was available to the Corps that revealed at least some of the
dangers that were created by the failure to armor
the banks.
Scientific information is now available about
many emerging perils.13 In this country the most
authoritative source for many of these is the U.S.
Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), which
was mandated by Congress in the Global Change
Research Act of 199014 as “a comprehensive and
integrated United States research program which
will assist the Nation and the world to understand,
assess, predict, and respond to human-induced and
natural processes of global change.” The USGCRP
prepares and periodically updates information, on a
regional basis, of anticipated changes in patterns of
flooding, drought, snowfall, wildfire, and other conditions. Conditions anticipated by the USGCRP would
seem, under any analysis, to be foreseeable.15
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The Fifth Circuit said the plaintiffs “have
mustered enough record evidence to
demonstrate that the Corps’ negligent
decisions rested on applications of objective scientific principles and were not
susceptible to policy considerations.…”
Indeed, Duval (referring to a levee that was
breached during Hurricane Katrina) stated, “Without
question, if the facts were that a non-governmental
third-party had caused the same degradation of the
Reach 2 Levee, which damage this Court is convinced was a substantial factor in the drowning of
St. Bernard Parish, the Department of Justice would
be seeking remuneration for the outlays that the
Government has made in the reconstruction of the
Reach 2 Levee and the expenses incurred in rebuilding the metropolitan New Orleans area.”

Protections From Liability
Had the Corps acknowledged the risks involved
in its mode of operating MRGO, but explicitly justified not taking precautions because of public policy
considerations, perhaps the Corps might have been
able to use the DFE as a shield. For example, the
Corps could have said that armoring the banks
would not have been worth the cost, or would
have interfered with the navigational function of
the channel. Likewise, a federal agency might today,
for example, declare after study that a facility for
which it is responsible (such as a veterans hospital)
may be vulnerable to increased coastal flooding,
but that the cost of flood protection exceeds the
benefit. This public policy decision could be found
within the agency’s discretionary power, invoking

1. The operations of the MRGO were described in John
McPhee, “The Control of Nature: Atchafalaya,” The New Yorker,
Feb. 23, 1987.
2. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971). See also
Edward P. Richards, “The Hurricane Katrina Levee Breach Litigation: Getting the First Geoengineering Liability Case Right,” 160 U.
Penn. L. Rev. PENNumbra 267 (2012).
3. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation (Robinson), 647 F. Supp.2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009).
4. This is completely separate from the litigation that has (so
far unsuccessfully) sought to hold certain emitters of greenhouse
gases liable for a portion of the damages caused by Hurricane
Katrina. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Index No. 1:11CV220-LG-RHW
(SD MS, March 20, 2012), appeal pending.
5. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation (Robinson), 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012).
6. See John M. Barry, “Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood
of 1927 and How It Changed America,” (1997).
7. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986).
8. 33 U.S.C. §702c.
9. Central Greene v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 434 (2001).
10. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991); Berkovitz v.
United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
11. 40 CFR §1502.9(c)(1)(ii).
12. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301 (1992).
13. See also James Wilkins, “Is Sea Level Rise ‘Foreseeable’?
Does It Matter?” 26 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 437 (2011).
14. P.L. 101-606. See also Center for Biological Diversity v. Brennan, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 65456 (N.D. CA 2007) (Global Change Research Act obligates federal government to carry out USGCRP).
15. New studies are frequently released with projections of
future environmental conditions at a regional or local level. One
useful source to consult on an ongoing basis is the CZMA Climate
Change and Coastal Hazards E-News Update from the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/news/climatenewsletter.html. For one prominent
recent example, see Ben Strauss, “Surging Seas: Sea level rise,
storms, & global warming’s threat to the U.S. coast” (Climate Central, March 14, 2012), http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/research/
reports/surging-seas/.
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